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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a staff member from a non-governmental organization (NGO) 
like the Open Society Institute approaching an HIV-positive prostitute and 
telling her that she may no longer receive treatment because the NGO does 
not promote prostitution.1  Then imagine an NGO closing a drop-in center 
used to safely house and train vulnerable sex workers for fear of losing 
funding from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).2  
Now imagine a scenario where the same NGO successfully assisted sex 
workers to develop safe sex practices in brothels by distributing 350,000 
free condoms every month.3  This NGO was poised to expand its training 
                                                          
 1. See Penelope Saunders, Prohibiting Sex Work Projects, Restricting Women’s 
Rights: The International Impact of the 2003 U.S. Global AIDS Act, 7 HEALTH & HUM. 
RTS. 179, 187 (2004) (discussing successful HIV/AIDS programs and the prosecution 
of prostitution). 
 2. See Maurice I. Middleberg, The Anti-Prostitution Policy in the U.S. HIV/AIDS 
Program, 9 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 3, 7-8 (2006) (describing the “pattern of self-
censorship” leading to the closure of many effective anti-AIDS programs). 
 3. See CTR. FOR HEALTH & GENDER EQUITY, IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. POLICY 
RESTRICTIONS FOR HIV PROGRAMS AIMED AT COMMERCIAL SEX WORKERS 3 (2008) 
[hereinafter POLICY BRIEF], available at 
http://www.genderhealth.org/files/uploads/change/publications/aplobrief.pdf 
(discussing the development of programs designed to educate sex workers about 
condom use); see also Sheetal Doshi, Sex Workers on the Front Line – of Prevention, 
THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 30, 2006), 
http://projects.publicintegrity.org/aids/report.aspx?aid=803 (discussing an effective 
strategy implemented by one anti-AIDS organization in India). 
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of condom use, but decided to forgo further funding when it learned of the 
“pledge requirement” stated in the United States Leadership Against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act)4 and 
the proposed HHS regulation implementing the requirement.5  Instead, the 
NGO’s legal counsel challenged the constitutionality of the pledge 
requirement and HHS’s interpretive guidelines in federal court.6 
Scholars and field experts have argued extensively that the U.S. policy 
stating that fund recipients may not promote prostitution is unconstitutional 
because it compels speech.7  In response, HHS published a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register to clarify what 
grantee organizations may do without being deemed as promoting 
prostitution.8  On December 24, 2008, HHS issued a final rule to further 
clarify the rule’s separation requirement.9  The final rule states that 
Leadership Act fund recipients that have a policy opposing prostitution 
may maintain an affiliation with organizations that do not have such a 
policy as long as there is adequate separation between the two 
organizations.10  However, grantee organizations have continued to 
complain that such guidelines are still vague and cause unwarranted 
chilling affects on HIV/AIDS outreach and treatment programs.11 
This Comment argues that courts and administrative agencies should 
interpret the terms “promoting,” “advocating,” “endorsing,” and 
“supporting” in ways that accurately reflect congressional intent and 
mitigate the chilling effect current U.S. guidelines have on NGO 
activities.12  Part II.A discusses the substance and purpose of the 
                                                          
 4. 22 U.S.C. §§ 7601-82 (2006). 
 5. See Doshi, supra note 3 (describing cancellation of expansion plans). 
 6. See 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e) (barring “promot[ion]” of prostitution); 22 U.S.C. § 
7631(f) (requiring policies that “explicitly oppos[e] prostitution”); see also, e.g., 
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 
274 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter AOSI I] (holding the pledge requirement to be 
“offensive to the First Amendment”). 
 7. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 1-2 (describing federal court cases finding 
the pledge requirement to be unconstitutionally compelled speech). 
 8. See Regulation on the Organizational Integrity of Entities Implementing 
Leadership Act Programs and Activities, 73 Fed. Reg. 20,900 (Apr. 17, 2008) (codified 
at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88 (2010)) (responding to complaints that the Leadership Act does not 
explicitly delineate prohibited activities). 
 9. See Regulation on the Organizational Integrity of Entities That Are 
Implementing Programs and Activities Under the Leadership Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,997 
(Dec. 24, 2008) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88 (2010)) (describing necessary separation 
between fund recipients and affiliates). 
 10. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 20,901-02 (defining “adequate separation” as financial and 
legal separation). 
 11. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 4 (discussing the counterproductive and 
self-censoring effects of the anti-prostitution pledge). 
 12. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 928 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000)) 
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Leadership Act and its anti-prostitution pledge requirement.13  Part II.B 
discusses the guidelines issued by the funding agencies in an attempt to 
clarify what actions constitute promoting prostitution.14  Part II.C shows 
how courts have interpreted “promoting” in the anti-terrorism funding and 
government-endorsed religion contexts.15  Part II.D notes that courts have 
invalidated the pledge requirement as unconstitutionally inhibiting First 
Amendment free speech rights.16  Part III.A argues that the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and HHS administrative 
guidelines (Guidelines) are vague and require impracticable separation.17  
Part III.B contends that the Guidelines should be struck down under the 
vagueness test, mens rea requirement, and direct subsidy theory used in the 
anti-terrorism and Establishment Clause contexts.18  Part III.C argues that 
the Guidelines contradict HHS’s funding practices in the faith-based 
context and therefore should be less restrictive.19  Part IV proposes that 
courts and funding agencies should strike down the pledge requirement 
because it compels speech and that the agencies should amend the 
Guidelines to make the “promotion” language less restrictive.20  This 
Comment concludes that specific delineations of what constitutes 
promoting prostitution and less burdensome restrictions would alleviate the 
unnecessary chilling effect currently suffered by NGOs. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Leadership Act: An Attempt by Congress to Eradicate Prostitution 
Congress passed the Leadership Act in May 2003, authorizing $15 
                                                          
(holding that a statute containing terms ambiguous to people of ordinary intelligence 
must be struck down). 
 13. See infra Part II.A (explaining how Congress intended to stop the spread of 
HIV/AIDS by controlling prostitution). 
 14. See infra Part II.B (explaining how the Guidelines attempted to clarify the 
Leadership Act by requiring legal and financial separation between affiliate 
organizations). 
 15. See infra Part II.C (illustrating judicial interpretation of the term “promoting”). 
 16. See infra Part II.D (explaining how courts have ruled that the anti-prostitution 
pledge forces fund recipient organizations to support the government’s views on 
prostitution). 
 17. See infra Part III.A (arguing that the Guidelines should be struck down because 
they are vague and require unnecessarily strict and unjustifiable separation 
requirements). 
 18. See infra Part III.B (arguing that court rulings in the anti-terrorism funding and 
religion-based contexts will help alleviate the Guidelines’ ambiguities). 
 19. See infra Part III.C (arguing that the Guidelines should be struck down because 
they are unjustifiably more restrictive than faith-based funding guidelines). 
 20. See infra Part IV (illustrating how clearer regulations would allow Leadership 
Act fund recipients to effectively prevent and treat HIV/AIDS). 
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billion to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria for Fiscal Years 
2004-2008.21  The Act identifies prostitution and sex trafficking as 
contributing factors to the spread of HIV/AIDS and states that a U.S. policy 
goal is to eradicate prostitution as a principal means of combating 
HIV/AIDS.22  The major purposes of the Leadership Act were to focus on 
the delivery of services through local community and faith-based 
organizations and to strengthen HIV/AIDS treatment, care, and prevention 
programs, especially for women, girls, orphans, and vulnerable children in 
hard-to-reach rural areas.23 
The anti-prostitution pledge requirement contained in the Leadership Act 
is a limitation on funding stating that no Leadership Act funds may be used 
to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or to 
assist any organization that does not have a policy explicitly opposing 
prostitution.24 The so-called “anti-prostitution” pledge was a U.S. 
government initiative that required non-governmental organizations 
receiving U.S. funds to sign an agreement explicitly stating that they did 
not promote prostitution. The basis for such a requirement was a 
congressional finding that prostitution is “inherently harmful and 
dehumanizing.”25  Presently, both U.S.- and foreign-based grantees are 
subject to the pledge requirement.26 
B. The Guidelines: Attempts by USAID and HHS to Clarify Which Actions 
Promote Prostitution 
The pledge requirement applies to all grantee activities, including those 
                                                          
 21. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 3 (2008) (explaining that funding efforts 
were concentrated on fourteen focus countries and that the Office of the Global AIDS 
Coordinator will lead interagency implementation of U.S. HIV/AIDS policy). 
 22. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-60, at 6 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 712, 
712 (stating that prostitution is degrading to women and is an additional cause of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic). 
 23. See id. at 8 (emphasizing  an approach based on local delivery systems). 
 24. See 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e)-(f) (2006) (implying that fighting prostitution is the 
most effective way of fighting HIV/AIDS). 
 25. See OFFICE ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE, POLICY DIRECTIVE 05-04, 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, 
TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003 – ELIGIBILITY LIMITATION ON THE USE OF 
FUNDS AND OPPOSITION TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING 2 (2007) [hereinafter 
AAPD 05-04] (describing official government opposition to prostitution). 
 26. See id. at 3 (describing U.S. Justice Department guidance as to application of 
the pledge requirement to U.S. and non-U.S. NGOs); see also Joanna Busza, Having 
the Rug Pulled from Under Your Feet: One Project’s Experience of the U.S. Policy 
Reversal on Sex Work, 21 HEALTH POL’Y & PLAN. 329, 330-31 (2006) (describing the 
House Committee on International Relations’ criticism of providing health care to sex 
workers); Matt Moffett & Michael M. Phillips, Brazil Refuses U.S. AIDS Funds, 
Rejects Conditions, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2005, at A3 [hereinafter Brazil Refusal] 
(stating that the Brazilian government turned down $40 million in anti-HIV/AIDS 
funding instead of complying with the pledge). 
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funded through non-U.S. sources.27  In addition, USAID and HHS have the 
right to investigate all grantee activities to ensure that they sufficiently 
abide by the terms of the pledge.28  However, the Leadership Act does not 
define what it means to “promote” or “advocate” prostitution.29  To clarify 
the vague language of the statute, USAID and HHS issued separate but 
almost identical administrative guidelines stating that a recipient 
organization will not be deemed to be promoting prostitution if it maintains 
adequate physical and financial separation with other organizations that do 
not explicitly oppose prostitution.30  The Guidelines’ principal goal was to 
clarify that an independent organization affiliated with a Leadership Act 
fund recipient does not need to explicitly oppose prostitution and sex 
trafficking for the grantee to comply with the pledge requirement.31  
Additionally, the Guidelines list five non-exclusive factors that may be 
used by the agencies to determine whether a recipient organization is 
complying with such separation requirements.32  Specifically, the 
Guidelines list criteria for when a grantee will be deemed to have 
“objective integrity and independence” from an affiliated organization, 
including legal, physical, and financial separation.33  These criteria for 
determining separation were the agencies’ attempt to clarify how recipient 
organizations may continue their operations with affiliates without 
violating the anti-prostitution pledge.34  More importantly, even after the 
issuance of additional guidelines, USAID and HHS maintained case-by-
                                                          
 27. See AAPD 05-04, supra note 25, at 3. 
 28. See id. at 4 (stating that the funding agencies have the power to determine 
compliance on a case-by-case basis). 
 29. See, e.g., Letter from Rebekah Diller, Deputy Dir., Justice Program, to 
Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, HHS (Dec. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/aosi_v_usaid/ (discussing the 
unconstitutionally vague language). 
 30. See AAPD 05-04, supra note 25 (describing USAID’s separation 
requirements); DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE REGARDING SECTION 
301(F) OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND 
MALARIA ACT OF 2003 (2007) [hereinafter HHS GUIDANCE] (describing HHS’s 
“Organizational Integrity” requirements). 
 31. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30 (reiterating the affiliated organization’s 
position regarding prostitution). 
 32. See AAPD 05-04, supra note 25, at 3-4 (requiring financial and physical 
separation, including separate management, accounting records, facilities, and 
equipment); see also, e.g., Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d 
219, 229-33 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding separation criteria in provision of legal 
services); Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 767 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(upholding criteria requiring separation). 
 33. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 4 (stating that none of the factors are 
dispositive and the agency retains the authority to consider other facts). 
 34. See id. at 2 (describing how a recipient can maintain “program integrity” 
through separation); see also AAPD 05-04, supra note25, at 2 (revising the Leadership 
Act’s blanket ban on recipient organizations’ activities with third party affiliates). 
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case discretion to determine whether there is sufficient physical and 
financial separation between the grantee and its affiliated organization.35  
The Southern District of New York ruled in Alliance for Open Society 
International, Inc. v. USAID36 that the Guidelines were overly broad to 
meet the government’s legitimate interest and granted a preliminary 
injunction preventing the government from enforcing the prostitution 
pledge on U.S.-based NGOs.37  In that case, the plaintiff, Alliance for Open 
Society International (AOSI), argued that the Guidelines still compel 
speech, and the court agreed, reasoning that recipient organizations are still 
not allowed to take a position on prostitution.38  The court also stated that 
the Guidelines’ separation requirement is not narrowly tailored to meet 
congressional goals, and therefore does not survive heightened scrutiny.39 
C. Legal Definition of “Promotion” in Other Contexts 
1. Anti-Terrorism 
Courts have grappled with what it means to promote or advocate 
prostitution, and the limited case law does not delve into the definitional 
issue.40  In contrast, courts have attempted to define what actions support 
terrorism and what actions are deemed to endorse a particular religion.41  
Two leading cases regarding anti-terrorism funding have attempted to 
define what it means to promote terrorism.42  In Humanitarian Law Project 
                                                          
 35. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 4 (stating that USAID will determine 
whether there exists sufficient “physical and financial separation” based on the totality 
of facts in each situation). 
 36. 570 F. Supp. 2d 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) [hereinafter AOSI II] (holding that the 
Guidelines still compel speech and are thus unconstitutional). 
 37. See id. at 547 (stating that the plaintiffs have shown enough cause to prove 
irreparable harm if not awarded the preliminary injunction). 
 38. See id. at 545-46 (upholding AOSI’s argument with similar reasoning used to 
strike down the anti-prostitution pledge in AOSI I); see also AOSI I, supra note 6, at 
274-75 (rejecting the government’s argument that speech is not compelled because 
there remains a choice to refuse funding). 
 39. See AOSI II, supra note 36, at 549 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 188 
(1991)) (noting the additional management and governance requirements in the 
Guidelines not present in other similar cases, like Rust). 
 40. See id.; DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 
2007); AOSI I, supra note 6 (all confronting what it means to “promote” but failing to 
give a definitive answer). 
 41. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 925 (9th Cir. 
2009) (explaining that criminal liability generally requires intent); Al Haramain Islamic 
Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1268-69 (D. Or. 
2008) (establishing the mens rea and vagueness standards for interpreting whether an 
organization is promoting terrorism). 
 42. See Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 927-28 (discussing what “material support or 
resources” means); Al Haramain, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 1252-53 (discussing the relevance 
of financial relationships in determining “promotion” of terrorism). 
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v. Mukasey, the Ninth Circuit examined the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and its 2004 amendment, the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA).43  As amended, AEDPA 
states that if one “knowingly provides material support or resources to a 
foreign terrorist organization,” he has promoted terrorism.44  AEDPA goes 
on to state that, “material support or resources” includes property, services 
(including financial services), lodging, training, and expert advice or 
assistance.45  In Mukasey, the court stressed the mens rea requirement of 
the amendment and established the rule that a person meets the requirement 
if they provide material support or resources to a designated terrorist 
organization knowing that: (1) the organization is a designated terrorist 
organization; or (2) the organization has engaged, or is engaging, in 
terrorist activity.46  In addition, the court also stated that because AEDPA 
fails to notify a person of ordinary intelligence as to what is considered 
“material support or resources,” that part of the statute is unconstitutionally 
vague.47 
In another terrorism case, the District Court of Oregon attempted to 
define the term “promote” in the anti-terrorism funding context.  In Al 
Haramain Islamic Foundation v. U.S. Department of Treasury, the court 
stated that if one provides financial, material, technological, and other 
support to a designated terrorist organization, one promotes terrorism.48  In 
that case, the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF) was designated as a 
terrorist organization, and the court stated that its subsidiary organization, 
AHIF-Oregon, supported terrorism because it had a “close financial 
relationship” with AHIF.49  Additionally, the court stated that money is 
fungible, making it possible that funds may be used either directly or 
                                                          
 43. See Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 923 (stating that Congress intended to clarify the 
AEDPA restrictions by defining “training” and “expert advice or assistance”). 
 44. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 45. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A(b), 2339B(g)(4) (amending the definition of “material 
support or resources” to include the prohibition against providing “expert advice or 
assistance”). 
 46. See Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 922-23 (stating that the circuit had already ruled that 
the government must prove criminal intent in Humanitarian Law Project v. United 
States Dep’t of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 47. See id. at 925 (reiterating that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
requires statutes to clearly delineate the conduct they proscribe); see, e.g., Foti v. City 
of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasizing the importance of 
clearly delineated statutes). 
 48. See Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 585 F. Supp. 2d 
1233, 1251 (D. Or. 2008) (implying that an organization must take the initial steps to 
distinguish itself from a designated terrorist organization). 
 49. See id. at 1250 (indicating that a website hosting articles in support of terrorist 
acts, and posting photographs and videos depicting violent terrorist activities, was 
sufficient to prove a close financial relationship). 
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indirectly to promote terrorism.50  However, unlike in Mukasey,51 the court 
in Al Haramain did not define “promoting terrorism” as knowingly 
providing material support to a terrorist organization.52 Instead, the court 
merely stated that the government did not have the burden to prove that an 
organization intended to support terrorism.53  The court concluded that an 
organization’s “affirmative conduct” of providing financial support and 
services to a terrorist organization was sufficient to constitute promoting 
terrorism.54  The court’s ruling in Al Haramain was significant because it 
provided a clear rule to organizations that if they gave money to a 
designated terrorist organization, or provided any services to such an 
organization, they were promoting terrorism.55 
2. Faith-Based Initiatives 
Faith-based initiatives are another area in which courts and federal 
agencies have attempted to define “promotion.”56  In Zobrest v. Catalina 
Foothills School District, parents of a deaf student attending a Catholic 
high school brought an action to require the school district to provide an 
interpreter for the student.57  The Supreme Court held that providing an 
interpreter under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) to 
a student attending a Catholic high school did not violate the Establishment 
                                                          
 50. See id. at 1251; Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136; Farrakhan v. 
Reagan, 669 F. Supp. 506, 512 (D.D.C. 1987) (stating that even contributions for 
peaceful purposes can be used unlawfully). 
 51. See Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 916 (stating that statutes must be sufficiently clear so 
that a person of ordinary intelligence reasonably knows what is prohibited). 
 52. See Al Haramain, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 1259 (stating that specific intent is 
irrelevant if the evidence provides reasonable belief that an organization provided any 
support to a designated terrorist organization). 
 53. See id. But see Holy Land Found. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 160 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (noting that courts are bound to consider whether the agency’s designation was 
reasonable based on the evidence present in the record). 
 54. See Exec. Order No. 13224, 3 C.F.R. 768 (2001), reprinted in 3 U.S.C. § 301 
(2006) (reiterating Office of Foreign Aseets Control’s authority to prevent financial 
transactions between U.S. citizens which it has reasonable cause to believe pose a risk 
of furthering terrorist acts in the United States). 
 55. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES: 
VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S. BASED CHARITIES 5-7 (2002), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/docs 
/guidelinescharities.pdf (stressing the protection of charities against unintended 
diversion of charitable support to terrorist organizations). But see OMB WATCH, 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: HOW THE WAR ON TERROR HURTS CHARITIES, FOUNDATIONS, 
AND THE PEOPLE THEY SERVE 16 (2008) (arguing that the Treasury guidelines do not 
prevent the diversion of terrorism funds and, instead, hinder charitable operations). 
 56. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993) (stating that 
the government may not use public schools as a forum to convey religious viewpoints). 
 57. See id. (arguing that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the school to provide an 
interpreter). 
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Clause and in turn did not constitute the government promoting religion.58  
The Court stated that if programs funded by the federal governments 
resembled a “direct subsidy,” the program was promoting religion.59 
Furthermore, the Court in Zobrest ruled that if a program is relieved of 
expenses that it otherwise would have assumed, and if the attenuated 
financial benefits received by the parochial school are not attributable to 
private, individual choices, the program is promoting religion.60  The Court 
reasoned that the Catholic school was not relieved of such an expense, and 
that because disabled students, not the schools, are the primary 
beneficiaries of the IDEA, the government is not promoting religion by 
providing interpreter services.61 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has ruled that a program does not 
promote religion when it provides benefits to recipients who apply their aid 
to religious education.62  In Witters v. Washington Department of Services 
for the Blind, a blind student pursuing a Bible studies degree at a Christian 
college appealed a denial of financial vocational assistance from the 
Washington State Commission for the Blind.63  The Court ruled that this 
funding program is paid directly to blind students and that it does not 
advance religion because the funds are made available generally without 
regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic, nature of the 
grantee organization.64  Additionally, the Court stated that because the 
funds go directly to individuals and not to the organization, the decision to 
                                                          
 58. See id. (stating that providing the interpreter does not violate the Establishment 
Clause because the government is offering a neutral service as part of an unbiased 
program). But see id. at 18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the government is 
participating in a school’s inculcation of religion if secular and sectarian activities are 
intertwined). 
 59. Cf. Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 
SUP. CT. REV. 83, 94-98 (1999) (stating that the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
decisions have intensified religious conflict through ambiguous standards). 
 60. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 14 (majority opinion); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 
U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 432 (1961) (implying 
that the Establishment Clause is viewed as a prohibition of improper governmental 
power). 
 61. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13 (reasoning that it was the disabled children, and not 
the religious institution, that was receiving the benefit from the IDEA); cf. Norman 
Dorsen, The Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 863, 868 
(1987) (arguing that the purpose of the Establishment Clause is safeguarding minorities 
with respect to religious belief). 
 62. See Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 483, 488 (1986) 
(recognizing the significance of equal access to school-related benefits). 
 63. See id. at 483-84 (distinguishing vocational assistance from funding intended to 
subsidize religious activities). 
 64. See id. at 488; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 81 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(implying that the constitutionality of Establishment Clause issues should be based on 
coercion or unwilling indoctrination, not simple endorsement). 
10
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support religious education is made by the individual, not by the 
government.65 
3. Abortion 
In addition to defining “promotion,” the Supreme Court has ruled that 
statutory separation requirements must be narrowly tailored to effectuate 
the government’s intent.66  The plaintiffs in Rust v. Sullivan challenged the 
program integrity requirement of Title X of the Public Health Service 
Act.67  In that statute, the program integrity requirement states that Title X 
programs shall not provide counseling services related to abortion, and that 
Title X projects may not engage in activities that “encourage, promote, or 
advocate abortion.”68  Additionally, the federal government requires that 
Title X projects must be “physically and financially separate” from 
abortion activities.69  The statute also states that to be deemed physically 
and financially separate, a Title X project must have “objective integrity 
and independence” from prohibited activities.70 
The administrative guidelines interpreting the Title X objective integrity 
requirement list various factors used to determine the existence of adequate 
separation.71  The Supreme Court in Rust ruled that the administrative 
guidelines were narrowly tailored to meet the government’s interest in 
prohibiting abortion because the regulation is not a general law designed to 
single out a disfavored group, but rather one that specifically excludes 
certain activities from the scope of the funded projects.72  The Court also 
upheld the separation requirements because the requirements did not bar 
abortion referral or counseling where a pregnant woman’s health was in 
                                                          
 65. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488 (reasoning that the choice of institution is left to 
the students, and therefore it is not Washington state that decides where the funds go); 
cf. PAUL KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 37 (1964) (stating that religion is 
being used to disqualify certain organizations from receiving public funds if such funds 
are available for all educational institutions except those controlled by a religious 
body). 
 66. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 180 (1991) (noting similar government 
interests as those stated in the HIV/AIDS funding cases). 
 67. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300(a)(6) (2006); see also Rust, 500 U.S. at 178-79 
(providing federal funding for family planning services). 
 68. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 179-80 (recognizing the government’s discretion to 
choose to fund one type of activity over another). 
 69. See id. at 174 (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim that the Title X regulations 
reversed a long-standing agency policy permitting nondirective abortion counseling). 
 70. See id. at 180-81 (enumerating the ways the Secretary could distinguish 
prohibited activities from those allowed under the statute). 
 71. See id. at 180 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1989)) (stating that abortion-related 
activities must be kept separate and distinct from Title X activities). 
 72. See id. at 195; see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of 
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1983) (noting that the regulations were targeting a 
small group within the press on the basis of speech content). 
11
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serious peril.73 
D. First Amendment Challenges to the Anti-Prostitution Pledge 
Requirement 
Previous lawsuits have challenged the validity of the anti-prostitution 
pledge, alleging that the pledge required NGOs to positively assert the 
government’s view, therefore violating their First Amendment rights.74  
Notably, in Alliance for Open Society International v. USAID, AOSI 
asserted a free speech challenge to the Leadership Act’s pledge 
requirement and sought clarification of the Act’s requirements.75  The 
plaintiffs were all U.S.-based, non-profit organizations working to limit the 
spread of HIV/AIDS worldwide, and consequently, they worked closely 
with highly vulnerable populations, including those engaged in 
prostitution.76 
The Southern District of New York ruled in favor of the plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment free speech violation claims, acknowledging that the pledge 
requirement chilled AOSI from planning and co-sponsoring a sex work 
conference.77  The court stated that the plaintiffs had sufficiently proven 
grounds of irreparable harm suffered from their loss of First Amendment 
freedoms and ordered a preliminary injunction against the pledge 
requirement.78  Additionally, the court ruled that the Guidelines require 
more separation than is “reasonably necessary” to justify the governmental 
interests.79  The court also ruled that the guidelines impermissibly compel 
speech, that they would not survive heightened scrutiny, and that they are 
                                                          
 73. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 195 (stating that the regulations only prohibit abortion 
counseling as a “method of family planning,” not when a woman’s life is in danger). 
 74. See DKT Int’l v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 761 (D.C. Cir. 
2007); AOSI I, supra note 6, at 237-38 (citing Plaintiffs’ argument that the pledge 
requirement unconstitutionally forces them to convey the government’s message 
against prostitution). 
 75. See AOSI I, supra note 6, at 235 (detailing Plaintiffs’ demand for clarification 
of guidelines); Complaint at 34, Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l v. U.S. Agency for Int’l 
Dev. (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 05-cv-8209) (implying that in contrast to DKT’s argument, 
AOSI acknowledges the that various harms that sex work may inflict on individuals). 
 76. See AOSI I, supra note 6, at 230; see, e.g., Doshi, supra note 3 (proffering the 
significance of personal relationship building in the effort of preventing the spread of 
HIV/AIDS). 
 77. See AOSI I, supra note 6, at 278 (citing Paulsen v. Cnty of Nassau, 925 F.2d 
65, 68 (2d Cir. 1991)) (stating that the loss of First Amendment freedoms 
unquestionably constitutes irreparable harm). 
 78. See id. at 278; Kushen Decl. at 53-54, AOSI I, supra note 6, at 222 (explaining 
why AOSI could not sponsor a conference dealing with sex worker topics); see also 
Green Party v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 389 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(reiterating the irreparable harm caused by First Amendment violations). 
 79. See AOSI II, supra note 36, at 549. 
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unconstitutionally vague.80 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. USAID and HHS Administrative Guidelines Describing Which Actions 
Promote Prostitution Are Unconstitutionally Vague and Require 
Impracticable Separation Requirements. 
The Guidelines are unconstitutionally vague because they reserve too 
much discretion to the funding agencies in determining which actions 
promote prostitution.81  Grantees receiving Leadership Act funds have no 
assured method of determining whether their operations meet the guideline 
standards because it only lists five non-exclusive factors in determining the 
legitimacy of grantee activities.82  Moreover, the Guidelines reserve to the 
funding agencies the right to take other undisclosed factors into account 
and the right to determine compliance on a case-by-case basis.83  The 
Guidelines are thus unconstitutionally vague because they contain no 
provisions by which recipient organizations may seek approval for 
affiliation proposals.84  The vagueness exposes recipient organizations to 
inconsistent enforcement and possible political retribution.85 
Additionally, the Guidelines fail to notify a person of ordinary 
intelligence as to what conduct violates its provisions.86  The Due Process 
                                                          
 80. See id. (stating that the government’s interest in conveying a uniform message 
on prostitution is not met because a substantial number of organizations are exempt 
from the Guidelines). 
 81. See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman and Rep. Barbara Lee, to 
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, HHS (Dec. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Waxman Letter], 
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/2f7d571dba331b96a1_3hm6bffbh.pdf (arguing 
that the agencies’ discrepancy discourages affiliation between recipients and other 
organizations providing HIV/AIDS services). 
 82. See, e.g., Comments on Office of Global Health Affairs Regulation on the 
Organizational Integrity of Entities Implementing Leadership Act Programs and 
Activities, 74 Fed. Reg. 61,096 (Nov. 23, 2009) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 89 (2010)) 
(stating that the guidelines provide no guidance about when it is necessary to establish 
an affiliate). 
 83. See 22 C.F.R. § 226.62(a)(3) (2007) (listing the penal authority given to 
USAID when it finds non-compliance); see also U.S. v. Gatewood, 173 F.3d 983, 987 
(6th Cir. 1999) (implying that more detailed criteria for determining compliance give 
administrative agencies less deference). 
 84. Cf. Cullen v. Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that the 
government cannot have a legitimate interest in discouraging the exercise of 
constitutional rights). 
 85. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 5 (listing the HHS’s non-exclusive 
criteria for deciding whether sufficient physical and financial separation exists between 
the Recipient and an affiliate). 
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting 
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)) (stating that the Fifth 
Amendment requires that statute a be sufficiently clear so as not to cause a person to be 
confused about the prohibited conduct). 
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Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires statutes to delineate clearly the 
conduct they proscribe,87 and when sensitive First Amendment free speech 
rights are concerned, the requirement for clarity is heightened.88  Because 
the Guidelines lack clear direction on this matter, recipient organizations 
are forced to comply with each factor and unnecessarily maintain the 
maximum level of separation between themselves and their affiliates.89  
Thus, the Guidelines fail the heightened scrutiny test mandated by the  
Supreme Court in First Amendment cases. 
The Guidelines also fail to define critical terms. As a result, recipient 
organizations still do not know whether privately funded programs with sex 
workers are prohibited from receiving Leadership Act funds such that they 
must be performed through a separate affiliate.90  Thus, the Guidelines fail 
to give the person of “ordinary intelligence” a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is prohibited and to provide explicit standards for organizations 
applying such standards.91  Moreover, courts should strike down the 
Guidelines because they do not define what activities are inconsistent with 
the recipient organization’s opposition to prostitution.92 
Additionally, the Guidelines fail to define what constitutes an “affiliated 
organization.”93  Such failure subjects recipient organizations to increased 
risk of sanctions for maintaining relationships with third parties.94  HHS’s 
broad definition of “affiliate” used in the food and drug regulation context 
                                                          
 87. Compare Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(emphasizing the unambiguous delineation required by the Fifth Amendment), with 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 
U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947)) (stating that impossible standards of clarity are not required to 
satisfy the Due Process Clause). 
 88. See Info. Providers’ Coal. for the Def. of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928 
F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 1991) (suggesting a heightened scrutiny standard for First 
Amendment free speech protections because such rights are inherently more valuable). 
 89. Cf. Julia L. Ernst et al., The Global Pattern of U.S. Initiatives Curtailing 
Women’s Reproductive Rights: A Perspective on the Increasingly Anti-Choice Mosaic, 
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 752, 760 (2008) (analyzing the undermining effects of U.S. 
foreign policy on women’s reproductive rights). 
 90. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 5 (overlooking the court’s ruling in 
AOSI, which denounced the Leadership Act’s failure to define “promote”). 
 91. See Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992); 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
 92. See 45 C.F.R. § 1610.2(b) (2010) (incorporating statutory definitions of 
prohibited activities); see also AAPD 05-04, supra note 25, at 3-4 (requiring objective 
integrity and independence between recipient organizations and affiliates); cf. Gentile 
v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048 (1991) (condemning a statute using words 
like “general” and “elaboration” because such terms of degree do not provide clear 
guidance for determining unlawful conduct). 
 93. See AAPD 05-04, supra note 25, at 3-4 (depriving recipient organizations the 
opportunity to establish and maintain effective working relations with third parties). 
 94. See 73 Fed. Reg. 78,997, 78,999 (Dec. 24, 2008) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 88 
(2010)) (omitting the term “affiliate” in response to complaints that the term was vague 
and undefined). 
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is inferred in the Guidelines, and the failure to limit the term violates the 
recipient organizations’ First Amendment free speech rights.95  The 
Guidelines’ broad definitions of critical terms force the recipient 
organizations to adopt the government’s view on prostitution. 
More importantly, the Guidelines fail to define restricted activities and 
are inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rust v. Sullivan.96  
Unlike Rust, where the separation requirements were upheld because they 
were necessary to assure the government’s intentions, the Guidelines 
require additional management and governance separation.97  The 
government’s interest regarding the Guidelines is identical to that in Rust; 
however, the additional management and governance requirements add 
unjustifiable burdens that were not present in Rust.98  The Guidelines are 
not narrowly tailored to meet the government’s interest because they ignore 
the existence of a less burdensome affiliate scheme used in Rust.99  Also, 
unlike Rust, where the separation requirements did not exempt a number of 
significant organizations, the Guidelines exempt many key organizations, 
thus undermining the government’s stated interest in conveying a uniform 
message opposing prostitution.100  Furthermore, different from Rust, where 
the Court upheld the separation requirements because the absence of a 
separate governance requirement allowed fund recipients to maintain 
control over affiliates, the Guidelines mandate that recipients may only 
express views contrary to the government’s opposition to prostitution 
through affiliates over which recipients have no control over.101  The 
Guidelines’ separation requirements are not justified by the government’s 
interest in opposing prostitution. 
Furthermore, courts should adopt the standards from Foti v. City of 
Menlo Park when interpreting the “promote” language because that case 
effectively dealt with a similarly burdensome ban.102  The court in that case 
struck down a picketing ban because law enforcement officers would have 
                                                          
 95. See 21 C.F.R. § 203.3(t) (2010) (defining “affiliate” as an organization that is 
either associated with or a subsidiary of a charitable organization). 
 96. See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 97. See id. at 196 (stating that the First Amendment rights at issue were not 
violated by the separation requirements). 
 98. See id. at 196-97 (implying the significance of management and governance 
autonomy in determining the adequacy of separation requirements). 
 99. See id. (determining that separation requirements must follow less-burdensome 
schemes if the governmental interests at stake are equivalent). 
 100. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 4; see also AOSI I, supra note 6, at 269 
(challenging the government’s argument that the Guidelines’ exemptions should play 
no role in determining the adequacy of the separation requirements). 
 101. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196 (limiting the separation requirement’s authority to 
affiliates that are under the control of the fund recipient). 
 102. See generally  Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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had to confusingly evaluate a myriad of factors in determining 
compliance.103  Similarly, courts should strike down the Guidelines because 
they call for overly harsh requirements.104  Before implementing any 
federally funded program, a recipient must evaluate all of these 
restrictions.105  However, the legal, physical, and financial separation 
requirements are more burdensome than the picketing ban in Foti because 
the funding agencies reserve the right to take all relevant factors into 
account even if they are not listed explicitly in the guidelines.106  Also 
similar to Foti, where the picketing regulation was struck down because it 
delegated impermissible discretion to the police, the Guidelines 
unconstitutionally reserve basic policy matters to USAID and HHS and 
allow them to adjudicate on an “ad hoc and subjective basis.”107  Moreover, 
like the Foti regulations, the guidelines are unconstitutional because the 
agencies may take into account a “myriad of factors” when determining 
compliance.108  The Guidelines’ five non-exclusive factors allow a “real 
possibility” of discriminatory enforcement.109 
B. The Guidelines Should Be Struck Down Because They Inaccurately 
Interpret the Congressional Intent Behind the Leadership Act. 
The Guidelines improperly interpret the legislative intent behind the 
Leadership Act.  The text of the statute states that the purpose of the statute 
is to strengthen U.S. leadership in combating HIV/AIDS by providing 
technical assistance and training and by encouraging the expansion of 
private sector efforts and expanding public-private sector partnerships.110  
However, the Guidelines, which were designed to clarify how recipient 
organizations may continue working with affiliates without violating the 
                                                          
 103. See id. at 639 (listing various factors that must be considered to determine 
compliance with the picketing ban). 
 104. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 4 (requiring the existence of separate 
personnel, management, and governance, separate accounts, accounting records, and 
timekeeping records, and separate use of facilities, equipment and supplies). 
 105. See id. (insisting the agency’s authority to give greater weight to any one of the 
listed factors). 
 106. See AAPD 05-04, supra note 25, at 4; HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 4 
(listing non-exclusive factors and reserving the right to determine each case on the 
totality of circumstances). 
 107. See Foti, 146 F.3d at 639 (condemning Menlo Park’s regulation’s broad, 
sweeping language and unlimited discretion given to the police). 
 108. See id.; see also HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 5 (stating that considering a 
broad range of factors may allow officers to subjectively decide noncompliance). 
 109. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 4; see also United States v. Wunsch, 84 
F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 1996) (reiterating the imprecise nature of the regulations). 
 110. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 5 (2008) (explaining the statute’s purpose 
to strengthen health care capacity through local training). 
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anti-prostitution pledge, do not advance these purposes.111  Congress 
sought partnerships with NGOs with HIV/AIDS experience because they 
“have proven effective in combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic and can be a 
resource in assisting indigenous organizations in severely affected 
countries.”112  However, the Guidelines severely undermine these 
partnership efforts by alienating the very communities with which the 
NGOs must work.113 
Moreover, the anti-prostitution pledge itself is not supported by the 
Leadership Act’s legislative history.114  Similar to FCC v. League of 
Women Voters, where the disputed provision was added by a House 
amendment with no debate and was held unconstitutional, the pledge 
requirement should be invalidated.115  Although the government argues that 
NGOs must endorse the government’s view in both their publicly and 
privately funded operations to not undermine its viewpoint-based program, 
Representative Chris Smith did not cite any justification for extending the 
pledge requirement to privately funded activities.116 
The Guidelines contradict the legislative history behind the Leadership 
Act and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rust.  The Court has held that when 
the legislative history is ambiguous with respect to the regulations at issue, 
courts should defer to the agency’s expertise.117  However, unlike Rust, 
where the Court clearly found that the legislative history was ambiguous 
and thus exonerated the agency’s regulations, the Leadership Act’s 
legislative history is clear that treating and preventing HIV/AIDS through 
cooperation is the priority.118  Also, unlike Rust, where the Court upheld 
                                                          
 111. See, e.g., Lauren E. Baer, Recent Development: Making Enemies from Allies: 
How the Global AIDS Act Undermines Partnerships to Combat AIDS and Sex 
Trafficking, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 513, 516-17 (2006) (listing examples of noted 
charitable organizations refusing U.S. funds in fear of not complying with vague 
Guidelines). 
 112. See 22 U.S.C. § 7601(18) (2006) (acknowledging the effectiveness of public-
private partnerships in preventing and treating HIV/AIDS). 
 113. See, e.g., CAROL JENKINS, JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS), FEMALE SEX WORKER HIV PREVENTION PROJECTS: LESSONS LEARNT FROM 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA, INDIA AND BANGLADESH 15-16 (2000) (discussing the 
effectiveness of NGOs composed of and led by sex workers). 
 114. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-60 at 28-31 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
712, 718 (failing to explain or justify the addition of the pledge requirement). 
 115. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 370 (1984) (anchoring its 
analysis on the overall legislative scheme rather than rationales readily apparent from 
the legislative history). 
 116. See Leadership Act, Markup Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 108th 
Cong. 148-50 (March 4, 2004) (avoiding a direct justification of Congress’ interest in 
expanding the Leadership Act’s reach to privately funded activities). 
 117. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (endorsing an agency’s power to adapt its rules to changing 
demands and circumstances). 
 118. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 2-3 (2008) (articulating the devastating 
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the HHS Secretary’s sudden change in policy because such change was 
justified through ample analysis, the USAID and HHS guidelines do not 
resemble a justifiable reaction to reports and comments submitted by 
lawmakers and legal experts.119 
In addition, the pledge requirement is not supported by the Leadership 
Act’s goal of encouraging private-public cooperation.120  More importantly, 
while the government argues that Congress included the pledge 
requirement to ensure that all fund recipients communicate a unified 
federal message on prostitution, the Leadership Act itself strives to 
advocate diverse approaches among NGOs.121  The Leadership Act’s goal 
of increasing the number of HIV/AIDS victims receiving prevention, 
treatment, and care services is hindered by the Guidelines.122  The House of 
Representatives, in reauthorizing the Leadership Act in 2008, stated that 
the goal of universal access to HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment 
services remains a priority purpose of the statute and that this purpose is to 
be carried out through training and extending the workforce to expand the 
reach of HIV/AIDS programs to those yet to be served.123  However, the 
Guidelines hinder Leadership Act fund recipients from effectively reaching 
out to vulnerable populations.124  Critics in the anti-terrorism field have 
also condemned a similar pledge requirement.125  They argue that while the 
effective prevention of diversion of funds comes down to recipient 
organizations establishing trusting relationships, the certification 
                                                          
effect of HIV/AIDS on vulnerable populations). 
 119. See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman to Alberto Gonzales, Attorney 
General (June 29, 2007), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20070629123546.pdf (addressing 
the Guidelines’ hindrance on public health best practices).  Compare S. Rep. No. 110-
128, at 33 (2007) (nullifying any requirements that impose more costly and 
burdensome restrictions than those used in the faith-based context), with HHS 
GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 4-5 (overlooking the Senate’s concern for unjustified 
burdens imposed by administrative guidelines). 
 120. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 2-3 (2008); see also 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151(a) 
(West 2010) (emphasizing the effective and efficient use of federal funds). 
 121. See 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006) (exempting four organizations from the pledge 
requirement); see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 391-92 (1984) 
(invalidating a ban on television editorializing because it only regulated local stations). 
 122. See generally Letter from Human Rights Watch to President George W. Bush 
(May 18, 2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/hivaids/hiv-aids-letter/ 
(expressing disapproval of the pledge requirement as undermining best practices in 
HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment). 
 123. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 2 (2008) (stating that the reauthorization 
seeks to further rebuild the health care workforce). 
 124. See id. at 3 (noting the vulnerability of young girls and orphans and that the 
Leadership Act targets such populations). 
 125. See, e.g., Barnett Baron, Deterring Donors: Anti-Terrorist Financing Rules and 
American Philanthropy, 6 INT’L J. OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 7-13 (2004) available at 
http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol6iss2/special_5.htm (observing the chilling 
effect posed by the anti-terrorism funding regulations). 
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requirements damage the necessary trust.126 
C. Courts Should Adopt the Approaches Taken by the Supreme Court in the 
Anti-Terrorism and Establishment Clause Contexts. 
1. The Vagueness Test and Mens Rea Approach Used in Humanitarian Law 
Project v. Mukasey Should Be Applied to the HIV/AIDS Funding Context. 
Courts should strike down the anti-prostitution pledge because other 
courts have struck down similarly vague statutory provisions in 
antiterrorism funding cases.127  For example, in Humanitarian Law Project 
v. Mukasey, the court struck down parts of the statute, holding they were 
vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would not know whether, 
when teaching someone to petition for international tsunami-related aid, 
one is imparting a “specific skill” or “general knowledge.”128  Moreover, 
courts have explicitly stated that when a statute deals with “sensitive areas 
of basic First Amendment rights,” the requirement for clarity is 
enhanced.129 Thus, the statute and the Guidelines are void for vagueness 
because a person of ordinary intelligence would not know what actions 
promote prostitution.130 
Furthermore, the Guidelines are vague because the discretion left to the 
funding agencies in determining what actions promote prostitution fails to 
meet the heightened standard required for First Amendment rights.131  The 
                                                          
 126. See generally THE CTR. FOR PUB. & NONPROFIT LEADERSHIP, PANEL 
DISCUSSION: SAFEGUARDING CHARITY IN THE WAR ON TERROR 9 (2005) available at 
http://cpnl.georgetown.edu/doc_pool/Charity061405.pdf [hereinafter SAFEGUARDING 
CHARITY] (stating that the guidelines are useless and embarrassing and threatening to 
organizations). 
 127. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 
2009) (holding language in the AEDPA impermissibly vague). But see Constitutional 
Implications of Statutes Penalizing Material Support to Terrorist Organizations; 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of 
David Cole) (defining exceptions to what constitutes material support). 
 128. See Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 928-29; see, e.g., Letter from Kay Guinane, Dir., 
OMB Watch  to Michael O. Leavitt, Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Treasury 2 (Feb. 1, 2006), 
available at http://www.ombwatch.org/npadv/CommentsPEPHARPledge 
RuleMay2008.pdf (explaining problems with the Treasury Department’s anti-terrorism 
guidelines). 
 129. See, e.g., Info. Providers’ Coal. for the Def. of First Amend v. FCC, 928 F.2d 
866, 874 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that the government may only regulate with narrow 
specificity when the issue concerns First Amendment freedoms). 
 130. See Letter from Rebekah Diller, Deputy Director, Justice Program, to Kathleen 
Sebelius, Sec’y, HHS 4 (Dec. 22, 2009), available at http://www. 
brennancenter.org/content/resource/aosi_v_usaid/ (stating that the failure to define 
“affiliated organization” makes the statute vague). 
 131. See AOSI II, supra  note 36, at 533 (requiring narrow tailoring by the 
government in restricting speech); Waxman Letter, supra note 81, at 1 (stating that the 
agencies’ discretion undermines Congress’ intent). 
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Supreme Court has ruled that heightened scrutiny should be applied when 
speech activities carried out with private funds are restricted as a 
“qualification for receiving federal funding.”132  Similar to Mukasey, where 
the term “service” was deemed impermissibly vague, courts should hold 
that the Guidelines still fail to define “promoting prostitution.”133  Also, 
like Loper v. New York City Police Department, where a statute that totally 
prohibited begging in all public places was struck down because it was not 
narrowly tailored to meet the government’s purpose,134 the Guidelines are a 
“blanket ban” on constitutionally protected speech.135  Finally, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that the government’s ability to condition participation in 
federally funded programs by the recipients’ relinquishment of 
constitutional rights is limited.136  Therefore, courts should strike down the 
Guidelines because USAID and HHS exceeded their authority in 
mandating blanket bans on constitutional rights. 
2. Courts Should Include a Mens Rea Requirement When Interpreting the 
Leadership Act and the USAID and HHS Guidelines. 
The Guidelines do not take into consideration whether recipient 
organizations knew that their affiliates were participating in prostitution-
related activities. Courts should interpret the Leadership Act and the 
USAID and the HHS Guidelines as requiring a mens rea element because 
such a requirement can provide a clearer guidance for funding recipients.  
Even if a statute does not explicitly contain a mens rea requirement, the 
Supreme Court has held that the government must prove the mens rea by 
showing that the defendant knew that his conduct was illegal.137  Similar to 
Liparota v. United States, where the Court stated that absent indication of 
                                                          
 132. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195 (1991) (applying heightened 
scrutiny to reject government restrictions); cf. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 
F.3d 757, 766-67 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that regulations may be subject to an as 
applied challenge if they are unduly burdensome and poorly justified). 
 133. See Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 924 (citing precedent that emphasized the potential 
consequences of ambiguous terms within statutes and administrative guidelines). 
 134. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-27 (1989) 
(denouncing a ban on indecent commercial phone messages because it was not 
narrowly tailored to protect children from dial-a-porn messages); Loper v. New York 
City Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a total ban on public 
begging is not narrowly tailored to achieve the prevention of the effects associated with 
begging). 
 135. See AAPD 05-04, supra note 25, at 3-4; see also AOSI I, supra note 6, at 271-
72 (prohibiting government regulations that suppress dangerous ideas). 
 136. See, e.g., O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 725-26 
(1996) (stating that the government may not impose conditions on expressing or not 
expressing specific political views on outside contractors). 
 137. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425-27 (1985) (noting that 
eliminating a mens rea element from the statutes would criminalize a broad range of 
innocent conduct). 
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“contrary purpose” in the legislative history of a statute, a defendant must 
have known that his conduct was illegal, courts should interpret the 
Guidelines as having a mens rea requirement because the legislative history 
does not explicitly contrast the notion.138  Additionally, like Liparota, 
where the Court stated that a mens rea requirement is especially necessary 
when the congressional purpose behind the statute is unclear, courts should 
require the government to prove knowledge of illegality.139  For example, 
courts have ruled that unless Congress expressly communicates its intent to 
dispense with a mens rea requirement within a statute, criminal liability 
must be coupled with a notion of intent to commit the crime knowingly.140 
Courts should apply a mens rea requirement because it provides 
adequate guidance, as has been shown in the anti-terrorism context.141  
Requiring the government to prove that a defendant committed a crime 
knowing that the disputed conduct is illegal provides a clearer standard for 
the defendant.142  That concept in the HIV/AIDS funding context would 
instruct grantee organizations that if they knew that any portion of their 
activities or materials funded by the U.S. government were used for 
prostitution, they would be promoting prostitution.  For example, courts 
interpreting the “promote” language should adopt the Al Haramain 
standard because it provides clearer guidance for recipient organizations as 
to what actions would be deemed to promote prostitution.  Similar to Al 
Haramain, where the court stated that the organization promoted terrorism 
because it contributed financially to a designated terrorist organization, 
courts should rule that the NGO is not promoting prostitution because drop-
in centers and condom distribution have not been proven to contribute to 
the spread of prostitution.143 
                                                          
 138. See id. at 425 (stating that a mature legal system emphasizes the mens rea 
element because it believes in “freedom of the human will” to choose between good 
and evil). 
 139. See id. at 427 (discussing the necessity of the rule of lenity, which can ensure a 
fair warning on criminal sanctions and balance between the legislative and judicial 
branch in determining criminal sanctions). 
 140. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488, 496 (9th Cir. 1964); United 
States v. Nguyen, 73 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952)) (implying the historical significance of requiring 
mens rea in the criminal context). 
 141. Compare Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (interpreting a 
statute punishing possession of an unregistered firearm to require knowledge that the 
gun is unregistered), with United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 
(1994) (interpreting “knowingly” to require knowledge that the performers in the video 
were actually minors). 
 142. See generally SAFEGUARDING, supra note 126 (stating that without specific 
targets, the U.S. government and law enforcement are ineffectively protecting our 
safety). 
 143. See Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 585 F. 
Supp. 2d 1233, 1240 (D. Or. 2008) (outlining an executive order finding that 
contributing money to a designated terrorist organization is always deemed as 
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Moreover, courts should adapt Al Haramain’s ruling that a recipient does 
not promote terrorism if it does not have a significant financial relationship 
with organizations that promote prostitution. Similar to Al Haramain, 
where the court stated that a significant financial relationship is a leading 
factor in determining terrorism promotion, courts should rule that recipients 
are in compliance with the financial separation requirement by not 
providing any funds to organizations that have not adopted a policy 
condemning prostitution.144 The guidelines incorrectly require recipient 
organizations to control their affiliates’ activities, yet do not take a mens 
rea requirement into consideration when determining noncompliance. 
3. Courts Should Apply the Direct Subsidy Theory of Zobrest and the 
Witters Approach to the HIV/AIDS Funding Context 
The recipient organizations’ HIV/AIDS-relief activities do not resemble 
a direct subsidy of prostitution activities.145  Courts interpreting the 
“promoting” language in the international development context should 
adopt the meaning of “promoting” used in Zobrest, where the court ruled 
that providing interpreters to a deaf student attending a Catholic high 
school was not considered promoting religion because the interpreter 
service was part of a general government program designed to provide 
equal benefits to all children with qualifying disabilities.146  Additionally, 
the Supreme Court has held that when a government funds a program that 
is in no way skewed towards religion, the program does not promote 
religion, and therefore, does not violate the Establishment Clause.147  Thus, 
courts interpreting the Leadership Act should strike down the restriction on 
funding based on promoting prostitution because the Leadership Act was 
designed to benefit all vulnerable populations and because HIV/AIDS 
services distribute benefits neutrally to anyone deemed a victim.148 
                                                          
promoting terrorism); see also Letter from Rep. Tom Lantos, Chair, Committee on on 
Oversight and Reform et al., to Henrietta Fore, Acting Administrator, USAID (July 20, 
2007) (on file with the author) (proposing the agency consider a less restrictive 
framework). 
 144. See Al Haramain., 585 F. Supp. 2d  at 1243 (addressing the issue of financial 
affiliation as a criterion for the definition of “promote”). 
 145. Cf. Mehlika Hoodbhoy et al., Exporting Despair: The Human Rights 
Implications of U.S. Restrictions on Foreign Health Care Funding in Kenya, 29 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2005) (suggesting that current U.S. funding policies that even 
restrict non-subsidized activities are in violation of international human rights 
obligations). 
 146. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 2, 10 (1993) 
(distinguishing this program from others where schools were directly subsidized to 
pursue religious activities). 
 147. See id. at 10-11; see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977); Comm. 
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782-83 (1973) 
(reiterating that non-biased funding is not problematic). 
 148. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 34 (2008) (stating that HIV/AIDS 
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Courts should also strike down the pledge requirement and the 
guidelines because the primary beneficiaries of the Leadership Act funds 
are the vulnerable populations, not the recipient organizations.  For 
example, in Witters, the Court stated that because the sectarian schools 
receiving IDEA funds are only incidental beneficiaries, the IDEA funds 
were not promoting religion.149  Under the reasoning from Witters, a court 
should hold that the HIV/AIDS victims are the primary beneficiaries of the 
Leadership Act, while the NGOs and charities disbursing the funds only 
benefit incidentally.150  Therefore, courts should strike down the pledge 
requirement because the Leadership Act funds were intended to benefit the 
victims, not to benefit the organizations receiving the funds. 
Moreover, the legislative history of the Leadership Act indicates that 
funds were designed to help all HIV/AIDS victims, especially young 
women and children in more vulnerable, remote locations.151  Following 
that logic, as in Witters, where the Supreme Court ruled that a government 
program supplying funds to a deaf theology student did not promote 
religion because the funds were equally available to all deaf students, the 
Leadership Act funds should not be subject to the pledge requirements 
because the funds were intended to be equally distributed to all HIV/AIDS 
victims.152  Thus, courts should strike down the pledge requirement and the 
USAID and HHS Guidelines because Leadership Act funds were intended 
to benefit all HIV/AIDS victims.  Furthermore, in the Establishment Clause 
context, for a program to promote religion, the government itself must have 
advanced religion through its own activities and influence.153  Similarly, in 
the Leadership Act context, the government is not advancing prostitution 
through the activities of the recipient organizations.  Funds that offer a 
neutral service to all victims need not be characterized as promoting 
prostitution.154  In providing HIV/AIDS funds, the U.S. government’s sole 
                                                          
prevention programs should be tailored to each community). 
 149. See Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-90 
(1986) (stating that the decision to support religious education is not made by the 
government because the funds go directly to individual recipients). 
 150. See, e.g., POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 3-4 (stating that funds are used to 
provide safety and training shelters). 
 151. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 34 (2008) (recognizing the increased 
vulnerability of certain populations due to the lack of education and access to 
preventative care). 
 152. See id. at 30; see also Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-49 (1991) 
(stating that classic terms of degree, such as “general” and “elaboration” do not provide 
sufficient guidance as to whether conduct is unlawful). 
 153. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825 (1995) (stating that the ultimate question in 
determining religious endorsement is whether any use of government funds could be 
attributed to the government); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987). 
 154. See, e.g., Witters, 474 U.S. at 489 (finding that neutrally available funds are not 
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purpose is not to eradicate prostitution.155  Therefore, courts should rule 
that Leadership Act fund recipients are not promoting prostitution because 
the government is not using its activities and influence to promote 
prostitution through the recipient organizations. 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
A. USAID and HHS Should Issue New Guidelines Clearly Indicating How 
Recipient Organizations Can Separate Private and Public Funds. 
Field experts praise less restrictive frameworks as less stigmatizing and 
more effective in reaching out to HIV/AIDS affected populations.156  
USAID and HHS should issue clearer guidelines because public health 
organizations have argued that the pledge requirement and the ensuing 
guidelines run contrary to best practices in combating the spread of 
HIV/AIDS.157  These organizations cite “trust and credibility” among 
vulnerable populations as the cornerstone of effective anti-HIV/AIDS and 
anti-trafficking strategies.158  Because such populations are so 
marginalized, they are often difficult to identify, requiring extensive 
relationship-building efforts to establish trust.  Research conducted by 
organizations like the Center for Health and Gender Equity (CHANGE) 
state specific methods proven to be effective yet impossible to implement 
without genuine trust.  One strategy includes drop-in centers, which 
provide sex workers with a safe space for gathering as well as services.  
Within these centers, sex workers are provided “language classes, beauty 
courses, computer access, and livelihood training.”159 
                                                          
deemed to support religion). 
 155. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 2 (2008) (implying that the purpose of the 
Leadership Act is to treat HIV/AIDS victims and that prostitution regulation is only 
one means). 
 156. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Legal Update: ACLU of Massachusetts v. 
Leavitt, U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts, RELIGION & SOC. POL’Y. ORG 
(March 7, 2000) (on file with the author); see also Waxman Letter, supra note 81 
(denouncing the counterproductive effects of stigmatizing restrictions). 
 157. See, e.g., POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 4-5 (explaining the irony of 
prohibiting activities hailed as effective in combating HIV/AIDS by experts). 
 158. See id. (describing the success of drop-in centers and the integral role of trust 
development); see also Ban Ki Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, 
Address to the International AIDS Conference (Aug. 4, 2008) available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm/1727.doc.htm (reiterating the need to 
protect sex workers). 
 159. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 3 (suggesting that adding permanent value 
to the lives of victims through productive education is the most effective way to 
prevent and treat HIV/AIDS); cf. Planned Parenthood Fed’n v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 
915 F.2d 59, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding the USAID regulations because they 
were the least restrictive means of implementing a non-justiciable foreign policy 
decision). 
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The Guidelines should clearly state how to separate private and public 
funds because doing so will allow recipient organizations to expand 
effective empowerment programs.  In empowerment programs, sex 
workers are trained as peer educators on HIV transmission and prevention 
methods, and these programs also set up collectives to ensure that all 
prostitutes in a given area use and promote condoms.160  CHANGE 
research states that these programs are only successful because 
organizations do not judge sex workers’ activities, and the pledge 
requirements would “sabotage the trust beneficiaries have in them, 
critically undercutting the success of these programs.”161 
Additionally, the pledge requirement and the implementation of the 
USAID and HHS Guidelines have caused a chilling effect on HIV/AIDS 
funding.162  Not only are individual drop-in centers and prostitutes affected 
immediately, self-censorship of donor organizations have led to the 
abandonment of entire sex worker programs.163  For example, CHANGE 
cites numerous interviews where senior NGO officials state that the 
pledge’s ambiguous language makes them “feel hesitant to bid on USAID 
funds for sex work programs.”164  Also, NGO officials reported that they 
have cleared their websites of “references to sex workers or their rights” 
and that they are avoiding media coverage “for fear of facing accusations 
of promoting sex work.”165  These are not abstract fears.  For example, 
SANGRAM, a leading Indian NGO engaged in HIV/AIDS prevention 
work, successfully trained and educated prostitutes as educators of male 
clients.  However, after its beneficiaries feared being labeled as promoting 
prostitution, SANGRAM did not sign the prostitution pledge, refused 
further funding and gave back the remainder of its existing funds.166 
B. USAID and HHS Should Issue New Guidelines that Clarify What 
                                                          
 160. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 3 (proffering the notion that sex workers are 
the most effective mechanism for educating and reaching other vulnerable sex 
workers). 
 161. See id. (refusing to accept the government’s position that HIV/AIDS can be 
effectively prevented and treated without empowering sex workers). 
 162. See id. at 4 (stating that the pledge and the guidelines sabotage trust within 
effective prevention programs). 
 163. See id.; cf. INT’L FED. OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCY’S, LAW AND 
LEGAL ISSUES IN INT’L DISASTER RESPONSE: A DESK STUDY 133 (2007), available at 
http://www.ifrc.org/what/disasters/idrl/research/publications.asp (describing the 
difficulties faced by international relief organizations due to stringent funding 
regulations). 
 164. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 5 (citing an interview with a senior 
international NGO official by Veronica Magar (May 22, 2006)). 
 165. See id. (citing interviews with NGO leaders by Veronica Magar (May 2006)). 
 166. See Esther Kaplan, Pledges and Punishment, ALTERNET (March 15, 2006), 
available at http://www.alternet.org/story/33284 (stating that the pledge requirement 
further stigmatizes vulnerable prostitutes and destroys needed trust). 
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Programs Are Specifically Prohibited. 
Recipient organizations have no way of knowing whether they are 
implementing impermissible activities because the current Guidelines do 
not define what specific activities are prohibited.  The funding agencies 
must remember not to undercut programs following best practices within 
the global public health community.  For example, direct engagement with 
sex workers is required to promote condom use and to train sex workers on 
negotiation of protection strategies with clients.167  However, due to the 
vagueness of the Guidelines, many recipient organizations are cancelling 
such programs out of fear that such programs will be viewed as supporting 
sex workers.168  Therefore, USAID and HHS must draft regulations that do 
not limit the recipients’ ability to work openly with high-risk populations 
such as sex workers. 
Additionally, the Guidelines must not exacerbate stigma and 
discrimination against sex workers.  The issue is not whether one supports 
prostitution; rather, the issue is recognizing the critical dangers associated 
with prostitution and human trafficking and how the guidelines are fueling 
social stigma.  A recipient organization’s declaration that it does not 
support prostitution will further drive sex workers underground, away from 
crucial HIV/AIDS services and treatment.169 
V. CONCLUSION 
USAID and HHS should suspend issuance of the guidelines and the 
administration should not enforce the Leadership Act’s pledge requirement.  
Not only does the pledge requirement unconstitutionally force fund 
recipients to adopt policies consistent with the government’s viewpoint on 
prostitution, the Guidelines have also failed to clarify what actions promote 
prostitution.170  Moreover, the Guidelines impose impracticable restrictions 
that are both unworkable and will threaten the effectiveness of HIV/AIDS 
prevention and treatment programs.171  Therefore, to fulfill Congress’ 
intention of reaching all HIV/AIDS victims equally through education and 
training, the pledge requirement should be repealed and the Guidelines 
                                                          
 167. See generally 22 U.S.C. § 7621 (2006) (emphasizing the importance of 
cooperation with the private sector, especially organizations that already have ties in 
developing countries). 
 168. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 4-5 (stating that burdensome separation 
requirements do not allow recipient organizations to set up effective affiliates). 
 169. See, e.g., Brazil Refusal, supra note 26, at 2 (implying that the Brazilian 
government’s recognition of the effectiveness of the sex workers in combating 
HIV/AIDS has improved prevention and treatment in the region). 
 170. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 4 (lambasting the anti-prostitution pledge 
for ignoring public health best practices). 
 171. AOSI I, supra note 6, at 270. 
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should be modified to impose practicable and less burdensome restrictions. 
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